Introduction
We live in a world where trade policies are liberal and immigration policies are restrictive. Recent globalization discussions give the impression that this policy difference is a modern phenomenon (Wellisch and Walz 1998; Hillman and Weiss 1999) Why have policies towards the movement of labor and goods always been so different in labor-scarce economies? After all, importing labor-intensive products is pretty much like importing labor. So shouldn't trade and migration policies reinforce each other? Consider for a moment the simple 2×2×2 model in which trade is driven by factor endowments. Furthermore, let us think about the country where labor is relatively scarce since that's the country for which immigration policies matter. Suppose such a country puts up a tariff to protect the scarce factor, labor. In the absence of immigration, wages will increase. But if labor is allowed to move across borders, the tariff-induced wage increase will be undone by immigration (Mundell 1957) . By the same logic, an immigration policy designed to protect domestic labor will be undone by free trade: the desired effect will only be achieved by restricting both trade and immigration. Simple theory predicts that immigration and import restriction should go together. In fact, they never have. Therein lies the policy paradox.
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There are many reasons why reality might deviate from these simple Heckscher- Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson predictions. Specific factors, increasing returns, and Ricardian differences in productivity are but three. Thus, trade and migration may be less than perfect substitutes, or they might not be substitutes at all (Markusen 1983; Faini, deMelo and Zimmermann 1999) . Nevertheless, the simple model is a useful start for exploring the persistent inverse correlation between trade and immigration policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, it traces out the histories of trade and migration policy in labor-scarce economies since the early nineteenth century.
We find it particularly useful to compare the two great globalization eras: the half century from 1850 to World War I, and the half century from 1950 to the present. Next, we explore some of the fundamentals that have influenced the evolution of trade and immigration policy. Key among them are the decline in the costs of migration and its impact on immigrant selectivity, a secular switch in the net fiscal impact of trade relative to immigration, and changes in the median voter and their impact on the political economy of tariff and immigration policy. We also offer explanations for the variation between countries in voter attitudes towards trade and migration, and link this to the key forces underlying policy. We conclude with some comments about current policies in historical perspective.
The Evolution of a Dual Policy Paradox Over Two Centuries
One could easily get the impression from today's labor-scarce economies that there is something immutable about a world in which the movement of labor is far more tightly constrained than the movement of goods. But things were very different a century 4 ago. The conventional wisdom views the nineteenth century as the canonical liberal period in which globalization was fostered by free trade and open immigration policies.
Such conventional wisdom may fit the predictions of the simple 2x2x2 model in which trade and migration policy go together, but it is a complete myth.
Consider first the evolution of tariff policy. Recent research has shown that protection was at very high levels before 1914, much higher than is often recognized, and especially so in labor-scarce New World economies Williamson 2004a, 2004b; Williamson 2006a Williamson , 2006b . Figure 1 plots the average tariff rates 1870-1938 for six regions, comprising 35 countries in total.
1 Tariffs were on the rise between 1870 and 1890, and from then until World War I they averaged around 16 percent, a value exceeding every subsequent decade except the 1930s. The view that the pre-1914 years were ones of relatively free trade stems from an obsessive focus on the European industrial leaders --Britain, France and Germany --whose combined average tariff was no more than 6 or 7 percent. Even lower tariffs characterized Asia and the Middle East, most of which was under the domination of the free-trading European imperial powers.
The average for the European periphery was much higher, pretty close to the average for all 35 countries.
The big regional outliers from free trade policy were the labor-scarce European overseas offshoots: Latin America raised tariffs to almost 30 percent by the 1890s; the United States had average tariff rates above 30 percent as late as the 1880s, rates that were still equal to those of highly protective Latin America by 1900; and the remaining European offshoots reached tariff levels of about 20 percent, double or triple that of industrial Europe. Furthermore, tariffs in labor-scarce economies were far higher on imported manufactures than these averages would suggest. In short, labor-scarce countries with tariff autonomy imposed high and rising tariffs in the global century before World War I.
Interwar de-globalization saw tariffs soar (and non-tariff barriers multiply). 2 This resurgence was led by the European core and its colonial empires (Figure 1 ), while the rest of the world simply reconstructed the high protective walls they had erected before 1914. With the resumption of peace in 1945, average tariffs stood at about 15 percent, a figure similar to the average for . By the early 1960s, however, the trend in world tariff rates was steeply downward, so much so that by 1970 the average for these 35 countries was lower than at any previous period, barring the inflationary war years.
The fact that much of the Third World remained highly protective does not change our characterization of the free trade trend since it is the labor-scarce OECD countries that matter to the policy paradox. Tariffs were lower in the half century following 1950 than they were in the half century following 1860, and they would look much lower if the comparison was restricted to the labor-scarce immigrant countries.
What about immigration policy? Here, there is no convenient summary statistic to describe immigration restriction, encouragement or neutrality: immigration policies typically involve rationing rather than taxing, so they don't generate tariff-equivalent measures. Furthermore, some countries used complex subsidies involving reduced steerage costs in transit, help with job search upon arrival, and cheap (or even free) land for settlement. The best we have is an index of policy stance constructed for five laborscarce and immigrating New World countries from 1860 to 1930 (Timmer and Williamson 1998 Although anti-immigrant sentiment ebbed and flowed, there was no call for outright immigrant restriction in the US during most of the nineteenth century, except for the demand for Chinese exclusion in the 1880s by west coast interests. 3 When the US did begin to close the door to immigrants, that policy move was driven largely by complaints from the median US voter (the unskilled and semi-skilled working man in urban occupations) who thought he was being crowded out by the relatively low-skilled 'new immigrants' from southern and eastern Europe (Timmer and Williamson 1998) . After more than two decades of debate, restrictive policy was introduced in 1917 with a literacy test (Goldin, 1994) followed by country of origin quotas in 1921, 1924 and 1928. The US quotas had two goals: reducing the total numbers, and reducing the share from poor source countries. In little more than a decade, every labor-scarce host country followed the US lead by implementing measures that restricted immigration of the unskilled from poor source countries.
Things have evolved very differently during the second global century. First, discriminatory exclusion of those from poor source countries gradually disappeared, to be replaced by non-discriminatory immigration policies of which the 1965 Amendments to the US Immigration Act and the abolition of the White Australia policy in the 1970s are but two examples. Removal of discriminatory exclusion might not have mattered much
were it not for the fact that the poverty trap was at the same time also gradually unlocked in the poorer parts of the world, and for the fact that family reunification policies allowed the 'friends and relatives effect' to do its multiplicative work. Compared with the nativeborn, the labor market quality of immigrants deteriorated in the major host countries, and it deteriorated by an even faster pace than it had in the previous century ( What role did changing immigrant sources play? The lower panel of Table 1 shows that the US index of source versus host country GDP per capita fell by 54 percent over the half-century between the 1950s and 1990s. The Canadian and German indexes fell by almost exactly the same proportion. The Australian index fell by somewhat less and the British index (at least from the 1970s) not at all. 4 It should be noted that these declines in source to destination GDP per capita occurred despite increasingly selective immigration policies that might have been expected to mitigate them. Having opened the door wider to the poorer parts of the world, restrictions on all potential immigrants had to be tightened with quotas and points systems in order to limit the size of the inflows and to raise the labor market quality of those admitted. Thus, immigration policy is much tougher now than a century ago simply because there are far more potential immigrants from poor countries to keep out.
The Fiscal Implications of Trade and Immigration
Trade and Revenue Tariffs. Customs duties were a major source of central government revenue in the nineteenth century. In recently independent countries with little experience with tax collection, few bureaucratic resources to implement it efficiently, and limited access to foreign capital markets, customs revenues were an easyto-collect fiscal source essential to support expenditures on defense and civil administration. This was certainly true of the United States and Latin America in the first half of the nineteenth century, although the US had more success in gaining access to European capital markets. Furthermore, customs revenues were especially important for federal governments in labor-scarce and land-abundant countries since low population and taxpayer density made other forms of tax collection inefficient. The average share of customs duties in total revenues across eleven Latin American republics was 57.8 percent between 1820 and 1890, and the share was even higher for federal governments (65.6 percent), since local and state governments were typically reluctant to give up their limited tax weapons after joining a federation (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004b: p. 216 ). The share was no lower in the United States. Alexander Hamilton thought "the tariff was more important as a tool of fiscal policy than as a instrument for promoting manufactures" (Irwin 2002: p. 16 ) and subsequent nineteenth century figures certainly seem to prove him right.
The ratio of custom duties to total state revenue declined steeply in the laborscarce world early in the twentieth century. The customs revenue share was 90 percent for both Australia and the US in the 1850s. As late as the 1890s, the customs revenue share still averaged almost 58 percent for seven labor-scarce overseas countries, when it was less than 20 percent for the UK and France. By the time the second global century had emerged after World War II, the customs revenue share had fallen dramatically in the labor-scarce OECD and by the 1970s it was only about 4 percent. Of course, this reflects in part the fall in tariff rates, but most of it is driven by the rise in other tax revenue sources. Sweden were at the top. We will show below how this hierarchy has influenced public opinion about immigration.
The fact that New World immigrants in the late twentieth century suffered a far greater earnings disadvantage in labor markets than did those a century earlier has added further fuel to fiscal anti-immigration fires in the modern era. That is, while US immigrant men earned 16.3 percent less than native-born men in 1990, they earned only 6.4 percent less in 1909 (Hatton and Williamson 2005: Chp. 15 ). Relative to native-born, immigrants today are less productive than they were a century ago. Relative to nativeborn, immigrants today are therefore far more likely to need social transfers than they 13 were a century ago (when, of course, such transfers were unavailable). Thus, United
States poverty rates in 1959 were much lower for the foreign-born: 20.9 percent for households with native-born heads and 14.2 for households with foreign-born heads.
Those relative rates had reversed dramatically by 1999: 11.8 percent for native-born and 17.4 percent for foreign-born (Hoynes et al. 2005) . (2005) show, extending the franchise increased the level of protection in countries that were labor abundant and reduced it in countries that were labor scarce. Such thinking seems to work relatively well for trade policy, but can it also be applied to immigration policy? Let us start with the question, who had the vote? Labor-scarce United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand set their tariffs high: despite the importance of agriculture, scarce capital and scarce labor won the day in nineteenth century tariff debates. But the story is complicated by the wide diffusion of both voting rights and landholding. Here, tariff revenues were particularly important.
They were used to buy the votes of the vast rural interiors in exchange for infrastructure development, particularly railways. In the antebellum US, this was played out as a coalition between the Northeastern and the Western States against the South (Irwin 2005 ), a coalition that was underpinned after 1862 by the expansion of settlement in the west under the Homestead Act, and by southern defeat in the Civil War. In Canada, the National Policy of 1879 explicitly aimed to build on the Dominion Lands Act of 1877 to promote western settlement, principally by financing railways with tariff revenue (Pomfret 1981, p. 87) . Australian post-Federation policies explicitly aimed to promote a high wage economy by protecting industry at the expense of agriculture.
Given that the capital-labor coalition had the upper hand in these countries, how do we explain the persistence of open immigration policies well into the twentieth century? Although anti-immigrant sentiment came and went with the Know Nothing movement in the US, pressure began to build only at the end of the century, and for two reasons. One is that open immigration policy was explicitly linked to the expansion of tariff-financed infrastructure in the interior. 6 The second is that while the land-abundant frontier began to dry up in the late nineteenth century, mass migration of low skilled workers from relatively poor countries gained momentum (Table 1) . Goldin (1994) has shown that the political balance eventually tipped in favor of restriction in 1917 after 20 years of debate, and as wage competition shifted northern labor's attitudes against immigration, with southern support. Elsewhere too, pressure for restriction mounted with the fact or the threat of low-skilled immigration. 7 The continuation of open immigration policy in South America is easier to explain, as much of the political power lay in the hands of the free trading Latifundia. But things were not quite so straightforward since landowner power would also predict free trade, and contrary to popular belief, tariffs were higher in nineteenth century South While tariffs would have hurt the exporters of agricultural goods and minerals, the alternative of taxes on land and mineral rights would have been even more painful. As in North America, tariff revenues were important-indeed recent empirical analysis suggests that revenue was the most important determinant of South American tariff levels (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004a) . But the political imperatives for revenue were not just (or even mainly) infrastructure for the rural interior (much of which was financed from abroad). Above all these revenues were used to fight the endemic wars that plagued the region. The average survey responses to these two questions are presented in Table 3 .
Three features stand out. First, the average citizen would like to see both immigration and imports reduced. Second, there is very little difference between the average opposition to immigration and to imports. On the basis of this evidence, why has trade policy has been so much more liberal than immigration policy over the last three or four decades? We think there is an obvious answer and we shall return to it shortly. Third, the correlation between attitudes towards immigration and imports across the individuals in the survey is not particularly strong: the correlation coefficient is only about 0.24 for the full sample. The regressions in Table 4 follow their lead, but with some differences. 9 Most important, we replace their country dummies (country fixed effects) with a number of countryspecific variables that allow us to assign explicit explanations to country differences in public attitude. These country-specific variables are especially relevant to the preceding discussion about the evolution of policy since the mid-nineteenth century, but we are able to include only a few, given the limited number of countries in the ISSP sample. The results are displayed in Table 4 , with robust standard errors clustered by country.
Following O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006), we characterize prejudice against things foreign by the variables labeled 'patriotism' and 'chauvinism'. Patriotism is measured by the average response to three questions that elicit the extent to which the individual believes that his or her country is superior to others. Chauvinism is measured by the average response to four questions that capture the individual's sense of loyalty to his or her country. 10 Both columns in Table 4 illustrate that these variables contribute strongly and positively to individual anti-immigration and anti-import sentiment. They provide compelling evidence that this kind of prejudice is an important component of individual attitudes.
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Relative to non-immigrants, first generation immigrants are opposed to immigration and imports while the second generation strongly favor immigration but are opposed to expanding imports. Females have stronger anti-trade opinion than males while age has very marginal effects in both equations. Consistent with other studies, the highly educated are less opposed to both immigration and imports. While they may have more enlightened views than the less educated, they may also suffer less from competition from the low skilled and may therefore fear immigration less. Being employed also lowers anti-immigration attitudes, but the effect is relatively small and not significant in either equation.
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The remaining variables in Table 4 are the country-specific effects (taking one value for each country). The log of GDP per capita is strongly positive in the equation for immigration opinion but not in the equation for import opinion. This is consistent with the view that immigration depends on absolute advantage while trade depends on comparative advantage. Thus, individual attitudes are more anti-immigration in the richer country where there is a greater absolute income gap between it and potential source countries. The level of inequality has a positive effect on both types of opinion. This is 21 consistent with Timmer and Williamson's finding that rising immigration restrictions after the 1880s was positively correlated with rising inequality and with falling source relative to destination country incomes reported in Table 1 . The population variable controls for country size but it has opposite effects on opinion towards immigration and imports and it is not significant in either equation.
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Variables specific to the immigration opinion equation are the share of expenditure on welfare in GDP and the share of the population that are foreign nationals.
Both of these have strong positive effects. Thus, the higher is the percentage of foreign nationals in the population and the more generous is the social security system, the more public opinion opposes immigration. Since high levels of immigration have been associated with immigration from relatively poor source countries, this, combined with generous host-country welfare systems, makes immigrants a bigger perceived fiscal threat to the median voter.
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In the import opinion equation, we include the ratio of imports to GDP and the ratio of OECD trade (imports plus exports) to GDP. Import penetration has the expected positive sign-more imports are associated with more trade opposition-but with very low significance. We expect the coefficient on the OECD trade ratio to take on a negative sign (in the presence the variable for overall import penetration), since trade among rich countries is taken to be far less damaging to unskilled labor. The result is consistent with that prediction but the coefficient is insignificant. In short, economy-wide variables seem to matter much less for imports than for immigration.
As we noted earlier, the fact that opposition to imports is nearly as intense as opposition to immigration seems inconsistent with observed policy outcomes. That puzzle can be resolved, at least in part, once we recognize that the share of immigrants strongly influences public opinion whereas the trade share does not. If there is a political threshold beyond which negative opinion is translated into policy action, then immigration policy ought to be more restrictive than trade policy in order to gain similar levels of public acceptance. In the data underlying Table 4 , the mean ratio of foreign nationals to population is 6 percent while the mean level of imports to GDP is a little more than 29 percent. Although these ratios are not really fully comparable, they are useful for illustration. If the foreign nationals share was raised by 23 percentage points (from 6 to 29 percent) then anti-immigration opinion would increase by 23 × 0.044 = 1.01. Thus, public opinion would become more negative by one full unit on a one-to-five scale. A smaller increase in the foreign nationals share, say 10 percentage points (well within the range of the data), would still increase anti-immigrant opinion by 0.44 units, which is greater than the standard deviation of the country means in Table 3 (0.34). By contrast, policies that increase the import share by 10 percentage points would have only small effects given that the coefficient on the imports/GDP ratio is small and insignificant. Hence, the political 'costs' of liberalization seem to be much greater for immigration than for trade.
Trade and Migration Policies, Then and Now
We observe a policy paradox for labor scarce economies in 1900 -restricted trade but unrestricted immigration. We observe a policy paradox again today -restricted immigration but unrestricted trade. What accounts for the policy paradoxes, and why the switch? Let's start with immigration policies.
We have argued that the progressive toughening of immigration policy and the progressive liberalization of tariff policy can be explained by a combination of factors.
When the costs and risks of intercontinental migration were large, the 'threat' of lowskilled immigration was muted since few of them could finance the move. Changes in the immigrant mix towards poorer source countries plus the increase in their numbers were the underlying anti-immigrant fundamentals at work, while macroeconomic shocks were the events that dictated the timing of the sharp changes towards more restrictive policies.
As the gap between poor sending and rich receiving countries increased, the relative quality of the immigrants fell and their quantity rose, forcing tougher policy. Nineteenth century immigrants might not have been a burden on the welfare state but they certainly competed in labor markets with native-born since immigrant skills were so similar to the average native-born. The policy backlash was muted in some countries by a limited franchise and delayed in others by developmental coalitions and party politics. But eventually the backlash hit everywhere.
Today, country differences in anti-immigration opinion are driven by: the scale of immigration, which represents the labor market threat; the size of the welfare state, which represents the potential welfare burden; and the universal franchise, which assures that those concerns are reflected in tough immigration policies. On the face of it, the puzzle might seem to be that public opinion isn't more negative towards immigration. Two explanations account for the puzzle. First, public opinion would be much more negative if immigration policies were more liberal. Second, the median voter today is far less threatened by labor market competition than the median worker was a century ago. As Table 4 showed, the richer the country, the more anti-immigrant is public opinion, but more highly educated individuals are less anti-immigrant. The facts that the median voter is no longer unskilled and that the gap between the skills of natives and immigrants has been widening offer important reasons why opinion isn't even more negative and immigration policies aren't even tougher than they are.
What about trade policies? Recent research has shown that they were much more restrictive in the past than has often been recognized-and especially in labor scarce economies. Why isn't the same true today? While the revenue motive was paramount in the nineteenth century, that imperative waned as revenue sources widened in the twentieth century. But that fact cannot fully explain the evolution from the high tariffs in the past to the low tariffs in the present. After all, there are other motives for protection besides revenue needs. Indeed, the results in Table 4 suggest that anti-import opinion is driven by much the same individual characteristics that determine anti-immigrant opinion. Thus, what applies to immigration also applies to imports: the median voter who is no longer unskilled faces less of a threat from the low skilled labor embodied in imports from relatively poor countries. While 'prejudice' does just as much damage to import opinion as it does to immigration opinion, why should it change? The real difference between attitudes (and policies) towards imports and immigration cannot lie with 'prejudice.' Some clues about the underlying fundamentals at work can be found in Table 4 .
First, anti-immigration sentiment increases with the scale of immigration but anti-import sentiment does not increase with the scale of imports, or at least not nearly as much.
True, an increase in imports hurts some more than others: using the ISSP data Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that those who are employed in import-competing industries are substantially more anti-imports than those who are not. Indeed, those who have skills specific to export sectors might be expected to gain. One reason why tariffs were so high a century ago, and so low today, is that the median voter is so different. Today there is a balance across voters between those who lose and those who gain from trade, because trade is more intra-industry than it was a century ago. Hence, an increase in imports has a more mixed effect on public opinion today than it did a century ago.
Second, higher GDP makes opinion more anti-immigration but not more antiimport. The richer the country, the greater the immigration 'threat' from low income countries. For those well below the skills of the median voter, the threat is labor market competition. For the median voter, however, the threat is the fiscal implications of the welfare state. This latter part of the dual threat is far greater now than it was a century ago due to the rise of the welfare state, and due to the fact that the poverty trap, which in the past held emigrants back in their poor sending countries, has been released, thus vastly widening the pool of potential poor and less skilled immigrants compared with the native-born. Source: Boeri et al. (2002: 74-5) . Notes: Data for those aged 16 and above are from the European Community Household Panel. The first three columns refer to differences between non-EU citizens and EU citizens in the percentage receiving benefit. The next two columns are differences in the percentage with less than completed secondary school education and the percentage with college degrees. The penultimate column refers to those adults in older age groups, and the last column refers number of children per household. 
